The World is Not Enough by Howard, Nathan Robert & Laskowski, N. G.
 1 
The World is Not Enough1 
Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski2 
Draft, 25 March 2019 
Forthcoming in Noûs 
Abstract Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the 
heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a 
position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism 
in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in 
Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been 
ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. We argue that the exclusively negative attention that 
the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection 
poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori 
knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the typical package of semantic 
commitments that reductivists have embraced since the Kripkean revolution.  
 
1 Introduction 
Twenty-two years ago, in “Reasons and Motivation,” Parfit (1997) defended his distinctive brand 
of Non-Reductive Realism (“non-reductivism”) in ethics3, according to which the metaphysical 
nature of morality — and of normativity, more generally — is not fully explicable in non-normative 
terms.4  Over the course of defending his view, Parfit offered several objections to Reductive 
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nature of moral normativity but also normativity more generally.  
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Realism (“reductivism”), the contrary position.5 In particular, Parfit made the highly provocative 
suggestion that our competence with normative concepts alone allows us to see that it is not even 
possible for reductivism to be true. Surprisingly, however, Parfit’s bold suggestion was largely 
ignored at the time of the article’s publication. So too was a similar suggestion made in his later 
article “Normativity” (2006). Not until the publication of On What Matters Volume One and Volume 
Two (2011) and On What Matters Volume Three (2017) did Parfit succeed in provoking a response.  
Parfit’s “Normativity Objection,” as he came to call it in Volume Two, has not been well 
received. Both Copp (2012) and Fleming (2015) argue that it provides reductivists little reason to 
give up their view. More recently, van Roojen (2017), responding to Volume Three, reaches a similar 
conclusion. Indeed, Sepielli (2017) tells us that “rejection” of several of Parfit’s arguments against 
reductivism, including the Normativity Objection, is now part of the “disciplinary consensus.” It 
will perhaps come as no surprise, then, that in response to related work on similar issues, one of us 
once had a journal referee tell us that Parfit’s arguments against reductivism are “frankly 
amateurish.”  
We instruct our students to read the work of philosophers charitably. This lesson applies 
doubly when the philosopher is Parfit, the author of Reasons and Persons (1984). If we find one of 
Parfit’s arguments amateurish, we must be especially careful to show that the fault lies in the 
argument and not in our reading of it. That is the project undertaken here. Our overarching aim 
in this paper is to show that there is more to Parfit’s Normativity Objection (“the Objection”) than 
                                               
5 It might sound incoherent to characterize reductivism as the view that the normative (e.g., normative properties, 
relations, facts, etc) is fully explicable in terms of the “non-normative” (e.g., non-normative properties, relations, facts, 
etc.). But it is not, as we’ll discuss toward the end of the paper. In the meantime, feel free to substitute ‘natural’ anytime 
we mention ‘non-normative’ if that sounds less incoherent. We’ll also discuss the relationship between the nature of 
the ‘natural’, for exegetical reasons, toward the end of the paper. 
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its critics assume. We argue that reductivist commentators, especially those whose views rely on 
Saul Kripke’s (1980) seminal work on meaning and reference, are right to point out that the 
Objection doesn’t carry much force against them, at least on the various readings of it that have 
been put forward. However, we also argue that there is a surprisingly natural but overlooked 
reading of the Objection that does present a serious challenge to such reductivists.  
In brief, the Objection is a dilemma, at least on our reading. Reductivists following Kripke 
can either model the semantics of normative terms on Kripkean natural kind terms 
straightforwardly, as most reductivists have done in recent decades, or less straightforwardly. If 
they model it straightforwardly, then reductivists embrace semantic commitments on which they 
do not answer the central question of how we have a priori knowledge of certain normative truths 
— or so we aim to establish as an intermediate conclusion in the first part of the paper. In the 
second part of the paper, we show that if reductivists adopt a less straightforward, more 
sophisticated view of the semantics of normative terms, then they must attribute meanings to those 
terms that are difficult to reconcile with their reductivism. To put the general thrust of this paper 
polemically: Decades ago, Parfit saw that Kripkean views of meaning and reference aren’t a panacea 
for reductivists. It’s time for the rest of us to catch up. 
 
2 The Normativity Objection, the First Horn of the Dilemma 
2.1 Reductive Realism, Analytic and Synthetic 
Parfit began his attack on reductivism in “Reasons and Motivation” by rebutting Analytic 
Reductivism (“a-reductivism”), the view that normative concepts refer to “natural” properties in 
virtue of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s falling within their 
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extensions — conditions articulable by wholly naturalistic, descriptive definitions.6 According to 
this view, by apprehending the correct definition, we get clearer on the normative concept, and, as 
a result, we get a better grip on the natural property to which those normative concepts refer. After 
arguing against a-reductivism, Parfit turns to Synthetic Reductivism (“s-reductivism”), the form 
of reductivism with which this paper is concerned.7 Proponents of s-reductivism claim that if there 
are any lessons to be learned from 20th century ethical theorizing, it’s precisely that some normative 
concepts, if not all, do not fit the a-reductivist picture for some normative concepts’ reference 
depends on non-analytic conditions for something’s falling within their extensions.8  
Consider both Moore’s Open Question Argument, historically taken as the primary 
obstacle to any variety of reductivism, and how s-reductivists enlist Kripke’s views on meaning and 
reference in their response. Some questions have a ‘closed’ feel, e.g., we know the answer to the 
question “Sure, Bill is a bachelor, but is he an unmarried man?” simply by understanding what’s 
being asked. According to Moore, however, there’s no value of F that makes “Sure, that thing is F 
but is it (say) good?” feel closed. But if goodness were reducible to some natural property, then there 
would be a value of F that closes such questions. After all, it’s plausible to think that it’s because 
being a bachelor is reducible to the properties of being a man and being unmarried that the 
bachelor question has a closed feel. Thus, goodness is irreducible.  
                                               
6 Again, we’ll say more about the distinction between the “normative” and the “natural” toward the end of the paper.  
7 See Boyd (1988) and Brink (1989) for canonical statements of s-reductivism. See Sayre-McCord (1997), Copp 
(2000), and van Roojen (2006) for important developments of s-reductivism.  
8 See Laskowski and Finlay (2017) for an overview of this history.  
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According to s-reductivists, Kripke’s theory of meaning and reference for natural kind 
terms provides convincing, independently motivated grounds for rejecting Moore’s argument. 
That theory has three components:  
Millianism About Natural Kind Terms A natural kind term’s meaning 
is exhausted by its referent. 
 
Causal Theory of Natural Kind Reference A natural kind term’s 
reference is wholly determined by an initial baptism of a paradigm 
instance of the kind. 
 
Rigid Natural Kind Designation If a natural kind term ‘K’ refers to  
K actually, it refers to K in every world (where K exists).  
 
Given the Causal Theory, purely causal relations associate a natural kind term with its 
referent. Consequently, that referent is determined wholly a posteriori. And given Millianism, a 
natural kind term’s meaning is wholly exhausted by its referent, hence any truths particular to uses 
of that term are knowable only a posteriori.9 To use the well-worn example, ‘water’ refers to H2O 
actually, and, therefore, necessarily. All that ‘water’ means is H2O, given the assumptions above. 
But since it was an a posteriori discovery that ‘water’ refers to H2O, and that reference exhausts the 
meaning of ‘water’, then that term’s meaning is knowable only a posteriori.  
Kripke’s view reveals that Moore’s argument relies on a false assumption, namely that, 
necessarily, if being F is reducible to being G, then “Sure, that object is G, but is it F?” has a closed 
feel. Given Rigid Natural Kind Designation and given the fact that a substance is H2O explains 
why it’s water, the property of being water is reducible to the property of being H2O. But clearly 
the question “Sure, that object is H2O, but is it water?” has an open feel to those who lack the a 
                                               
9 We say truths particular to uses of that term because plausibly, for a natural kind term ‘K’ it’s knowable a priori that 
either o is K or it isn’t. 
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posteriori knowledge that ‘water’ refers to H2O. Thus, it is not the case that if being F is reducible 
to being G, then “Sure, that object is G, but is it F?” necessarily has a closed feel.  
Kripke applied his theory primarily to a narrow class of terms including names and natural 
kind terms. But by applying Kripke’s view to normative kind terms, s-reductivists rebut Moore’s 
argument. Just as “Sure, that object is H2O, but is it water?” has an open feel for those ignorant of 
the fact that water is reducible to H2O, “Sure, that object is F, but is it good?’’ will have an open 
feel until we discover the naturalistic property F to which goodness is reducible.  
Let us coin a term to discuss the view that normative terms are like Kripkean names and 
natural kind terms. Simple s-reductivism is the conjunction of three claims: 
Millianism About Normative Kind Terms A normative kind term’s 
meaning is exhausted by its referent. 
 
Causal Theory of Normative Kind Reference A normative kind 
term’s reference is wholly determined by an initial baptism of a 
paradigm instance of the kind. 
 
Rigid Normative Kind Designation If a normative kind term ‘K’ refers 
to K actually, it refers to K in every world (where K exists).  
 
We don’t claim that any prominent s-reductivist explicitly endorses simple s-reductivism.10 Rather, 
we claim that simple s-reductivism corresponds to a popular understanding of the view — one that 
helps for assessing the kind of pressure that the Objection puts on s-reductivists.  
 
 
 
                                               
10 Though we’ll suggest below that it is possible to better understand part of the state of the debate about s-reductivism 
on the assumption that many do. 
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2.2 The First Horn, Introduced  
As mentioned, Parfit (1997: 122) introduces his basic concern with s-reductivism in “Reasons and 
Motivation.” But it wasn’t until he reproduced his concern 15 years later in the following passage 
in On What Matters Volume One and Volume Two (2011: 325), under the heading of the 
“Normativity Objection,” that philosophers began to take notice.  
Of the reductive views that are both plausible and interesting, most 
are not analytical. But these views must still be constrained by the 
relevant concepts. These views are not analytical because the 
relevant concepts leave open various possibilities, between which we 
must decide on nonconceptual grounds. Many other possibilities 
are, however, conceptually excluded. Thus, on a wider pre-scientific 
version of the concept of heat, it was conceptually possible that heat 
should turn out to be molecular kinetic energy, or should instead 
turn out to be, or to involve, a substance, as the phlogiston theory 
claimed. But heat could not have turned out to be a shade of blue, 
or a medieval king. And if we claimed that rivers were sonnets, or 
that experiences were stones, we could not defend these claims by 
saying that they were not intended to be analytic, or conceptual 
truths. Others could rightly reply that, given the meaning of these 
claims, they could not possibly be true. This, I believe, is the way in 
which, though much less obviously, [s-reductivism] could not be 
true.11 
 
Unpacking this passage through the words of one of its targets is instructive. Copp (2012: 
46-49), a longtime champion of a version of s-reductivism, characterizes Parfit’s worry in this 
passage as Parfit’s “chief objection” to s-reductivism. According to Copp, the worry consists in “… 
one premise, the claim that normative concepts exclude the possibility that a normative property 
be natural.” Support for this premise, Copp notes, traces to an analogy with heat that Parfit 
provides — an analogy that Copp takes to be apt. For after agreeing with Parfit that HEAT12 
                                               
11 See also Parfit (2017: 72), for his most recent and posthumous statement of the Objection.  
12 Small caps denote concepts. 
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“conceptually excludes” the possibility that heat has anything to do with shades of blue or medieval 
kings, Copp adds “it is plausible that the concept of rightness rules out the possibility that rightness 
is a rocket or a mountain lion or that it is the property of being a yellow rose.”  
However, Copp then reminds us that Parfit aims to establish far more than the claim that 
some reductive theses cannot be true, e.g., that a component of morality, such as rightness, has little 
to do with medieval kings, rockets, or yellow roses. Copp reminds us that Parfit aims to show that 
all reductive theses concerning every aspect of morality and normativity more generally cannot be 
true — or, at the very least, all of the “most plausible and interesting” ones. (Parfit 2011: 325)  
But it is far from obvious, Copp suggests, that our competence with a normative concept 
like RIGHT can establish quite so much, even if it is possible that it establishes that rightness isn’t 
a rocket. Compare the intuition that rightness is not a rocket to the intuition that rightness is not, 
as Copp (2007) argues elsewhere, conforming to standards that enable societies to meet their 
needs. Copp’s preferred naturalistic reduction of rightness is immediately more plausible than the 
reduction of rightness to rockethood. This difference in prima facie plausibility, Copp suggests, 
should make us doubt Parfit’s claim that our competence with RIGHT can reveal the impossibility 
of s-reductivism.  
We agree. But we also think Copp misses something important in Parfit’s discussion of s-
reductivism. Parfit appears to suggest that sentences like ‘sonnets are not rivers’ are similar to 
sentences involving normative terms like ‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ in that their truth is 
knowable a priori. For Parfit, that’s because the truth of both of these sentences is analytic. Of 
course, s-reductivists disagree, or at least, simple s-reductivists do. For on simple s-reductivism, 
the meaning of ‘rightness’ is its referent and that referent is determined a posteriori. Thus, the 
sentence ‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ is a synthetic truth that is knowable only a posteriori.  
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Compare ‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ to the similar claim that ‘Bill is not a yellow rose’. 
Is that claim analytic? Surely not. After all, on Kripkean assumptions, Bill exhausts the meaning 
of the proper name ‘Bill’ and we haven’t told you what ‘Bill’ refers to. Given your ignorance about 
the name’s referent, the sentence might be true. We could have named our favourite yellow rose 
‘Bill’ just as easily as we could have named one of our pet dogs ‘Bill’. The Kripkean semantics for 
natural kind terms sketched above resembles the semantics of names in this respect. So, unless we 
undertake the appropriate a posteriori investigations, we’re not in a position to know whether 
‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ is true, at least on simple s-reductivism.  
As a result, rather than resembling the truth of ‘sonnets are not rivers’, the truth of 
‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ more closely resembles the truth of ‘Bill is not a yellow rose’, 
assuming that we’ve named a yellow rose ‘Bill’. That strikes us as a serious issue for simple s-
reductivism. Contra Copp, then, Pafit is not best understood as offering an objection consisting 
in a single, unsupported premise. Instead, Parfit’s discussion of s-reductivism highlights an 
implausible commitment of a familiar form of the view: that the truth of sentences like ‘rightness 
is not a yellow rose’ is not knowable a priori.13  
The problem we take Parfit to be highlighting is so obvious that it’s easy to suspect we’ve 
missed something. But it turns out that the issue of how some a priori knowable normative truths 
are a priori knowable has received almost no attention from friends of s-reductivism.14 Why this is 
                                               
13 As Lutz and Lenman (2018, original emphasis) confirm in the SEP entry on “moral naturalism”: “Synthetic 
naturalists claim that all moral claims are synthetic claims, knowable by empirical methods” and, later, “because this 
reduction of reasons will take the form of a synthetic reduction, there end up being no conceptual connections between 
the normative and the natural.” 
14 We count ourselves among friends of reductivism who have only recently began thinking about the issue seriously, 
even though one of us has defended a brand of s-reductivism that is broadly similar to simple s-reductivism in print, 
e.g., see Laskowski (2019). 
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the case is an interesting question. Two answers come to mind. One is that many card-carrying s-
reductivists embrace versions of s-reductivism that resemble simple s-reductivism.15 As such, they 
maintain that the truths expressed by sentences like ‘rightness is not a rocket’ really are knowable 
only a posteriori, and hence they see challenges of the sort we are advancing as locating a feature 
not a bug of their view. However, we find it so plausible that sentences like ‘rightness is not a 
rocket’ are knowable a priori that admitting otherwise amounts to a reductio of views that too closely 
resemble simple s-reductivism. 
Another explanation can be extracted from a recent discussion of related issues from 
Schroeter and Schroeter (2013: 5, original emphasis): 
Most semantic externalists [which is another label for views about 
reference and meaning that we’re discussing]...agree that reference 
entails epistemic access of some sort: the reason why it is absurd to 
suppose your term ‘water’ refers to Julius Caesar or to strawberry jam 
is because your use of the term affords no epistemic access whatever 
to those things: the ability to refer seems to entail some knowledge 
of what it is one is referring to.16 
 
Schroeter and Schroeter appear to be suggesting that, at least from the perspective of s-reductivism, 
reference and epistemology go hand-in-hand. And since s-reductivists aren’t shy about explaining 
how reference for normative terms is supposed to work, it might be that s-reductivists also take 
                                               
15 Further evidence that this understanding of s-reductivism is common is codified in van Roojen’s (2015: 221, our 
emphasis) metaethics textbook: “Cornell Realists [e.g., s-reductivists like Boyd and Brink cited above] certainly do 
deny...that knowledge of identity or constitution relations in the moral realm are a priori accessible.”  
16 In their example, Schroeter and Schroeter mention Julius Caesar. Though they are not explicit, Schroeter and 
Schroeter are surely referencing the so-called “Julius Caesar” problem inherited from Frege (1884). On his way to 
formulating Axiom V, Frege suggests defining ‘zero’ with Hume’s Principle, on which the number of the members of 
F is the same as the number of members of G iff there is a bijection between the members of F and G. But Frege goes 
on to reject Hume’s Principle on the grounds that it doesn’t give us a criterion for the application of ‘zero’, thereby 
leaving it implausibly open that Julius Caesar is the number zero. We see the problems that Parfit raises for s-
reductivism as related to the Julius Caesar problem, and since no solutions to that problem enjoy widespread support, 
we are further encouraged to think that Parfit has his finger on an important but underappreciated problem for s-
reductivism.  
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themselves to have explained everything that needs explaining when it comes to the epistemology 
of normativity. In particular, it could be that because they offered an explanation how all the 
individual terms in ‘rightness is not a yellow rose’ refer, they takenthemselves to have also explained 
everything that needs explaining about the knowability of this sentence’s truth. That could be why 
friends of s-reductivism have said so little about the issue of a priori knowability. Of course, we 
think this has been a mistake: explaining the referential properties of normative terms doesn’t settle 
a range of epistemic issues involving them, including, especially, the epistemic issue of how the 
truth of some sentences containing normative terms is knowable a priori.  
 
2.3 From Simple to Sophisticated S-Reductivism 
On our reading, Parfit’s Objection puts pressure on s-reductivists to explain how some normative 
truths are a priori knowable. S-reductivists who cave to such pressure then face a choice-point: 
they can say that there is synthetic a priori knowability (as in the epistemic category) or analytic a 
priori knowability. Because the epistemic category of the synthetic a priori is controversial, we 
assume that the best path forward for s-reductivists is to take the latter route.17 This involves 
modifying some of the three central claims of simple s-reductivism. In doing so, simple s-
reductivists become sophisticated s-reductivists who deny that normative kind terms function 
straightforwardly on the model provided by Kripke. 
Which of the three claims of simple s-reductivism should sophisticated s-reductivists 
modify? Of course, one of tenets of reductivism is that normative properties are reducible to natural 
                                               
17 Though we set aside synthetic a priori knowledge of normative truths, it may be natural for simple s-reductivists to 
appeal to such knowledge. However, to our knowledge, no sustained discussion of the synthetic a priori as it relates to 
post-Kripkean reductive projects in ethics exists, perhaps because of the strong epistemic commitments that such a 
project involves. There is probably much to learn from such a discussion. 
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ones. This core thought constrains how s-reductivists can be sophisticated. For example, it will 
likely not be fruitful for s-reductivists to deny Rigid Normative Kind Designation, since that would 
make normative kind terms puzzlingly disanalogous to natural kind terms. As a result, we suspect 
that s-reductivists will find it more appealing to modify or deny Millianism About Normative Kind 
Terms and the Causal Theory of Normative Kind Reference.  
Indeed, some philosophers sympathetic with s-reductivism, who have commented on 
issues related to the Objection, seem to reject the Causal Theory of Normative Kind Reference 
explicitly. According to that principle, features of the paradigm instances of the substance initially 
baptized by a term fix the reference of subsequent uses of that term. But there are other ways of 
fixing a term’s referent that are consistent with s-reductivism, e.g., we might imagine that 
normative kind terms are associated with an a priori reference-fixing description.18 Consider ‘water’ 
again. It could be that the term is associated with a description, such as ‘the stuff in our taps, lakes, 
and streams’, and that the term necessarily designates whatever actually satisfies the description. 
Since H2O actually satisfies that description, ‘water’ necessarily designates H2O.  
Sophisticated s-reductivists could claim, likewise, that not only do a priori reference-fixing 
descriptions partly determine how normative terms refer, but they also play a role in making the 
relevant normative truths knowable a priori.19 For example, it could be that ‘rightness’ is associated 
with a description such as the actions of the action-type that a maximally informed observer would desire 
to perform, which would constrain the causal chains relevant to reference determination. In turn, 
                                               
18 See Schroeder (2005), which defends a version of reductivism against Parfit’s arguments. In footnote eleven, he 
explicitly discusses such descriptions for the term ‘God’. However, given the article’s broader context, this is also an 
oblique discussion of a similar possibility for normative kind reference. 
19 Finding a role for such descriptions to play isn’t incompatible with a Kripkean theory of reference. See Stanford & 
Kitcher (2000).  
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such a description would also make the truth of the sentence ‘rightness is not a yellow rose’  
knowable a priori, in part because it’s plausibly a priori that a yellow rose isn’t an action-type.  
To be clear, we don’t offer this as a serious candidate for such a description. Instead, we 
offer it merely to illustrate how a priori reference-fixing descriptions could do the epistemic work 
that s-reductivists need done.20 Though we think it is possible for an a priori reference-fixing 
description to do this work, in the second half of the paper, we will argue that sophisticated s-
reductivists still face a version of the Objection. Showing this requires us to read a bit more into 
the Objection than Parfit likely had in mind. But, in any case, we think Parfit was on the right 
track, and that the reductivist-unfriendly conclusions we draw from his remarks are deeply 
Parfitian.  
 
3 The Normativity Objection, the Second Horn of the Dilemma 
3.1 Stage setting 
We’ve been arguing that, on our reading of Parfit’s Objection, s-reductivists face a dilemma: either 
they are simple s-reductivists, implausibly renouncing any a priori knowledge of normative truths 
gained in virtue of our competence with normative (and natural) concepts alone, i.e., implausibly 
renouncing all analytic knowledge of normative truths, or they are sophisticated s-reductivists and 
they must attribute meanings to normative kind terms that are, we will argue, difficult to reconcile 
with their metaphysical commitments. On one way of thinking about the challenge, s-reductivists 
must explain how their view is synthetic enough to avoid the Open Question Argument without 
                                               
20 Nor is it a coincidence that we do not defend any other particular a priori reference-fixing description to associate 
with ‘rightness’. Doing so is arguably one of the most challenging aspects of defending this sort of sophisticated s-
reductivism, as is evidenced by the fact that champions of a priori reference-fixing descriptions outside of ethics, such 
as Chalmers (1996: 59), even punt on the issue.  
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being so synthetic, as it were, as to imply that we have no analytic knowledge of normative truths. 
We take ourselves to have already argued for the first horn of the dilemma. We’ll now address the 
second. 
 We’ll begin where the simple and sophisticated versions of s-reductivism differ. 
Sophisticated, but not simple, versions of s-reductivism allow for the possibility of analytic 
knowledge of certain distinctively normative truths21, perhaps via the role that a priori reference-
fixing descriptions play in both determining reference and partially constituting the meanings of 
normative terms (for simplicity, we’ll speak only of ‘meaning’ without also mentioning such 
descriptions from here on). Which truths are knowable analytically is an interesting question. We 
suspect those will differ between different sophisticated s-reductivist accounts. Nevertheless, 
considering particular sentences helps us to identify some truths for which all sophisticated s-
reductivists should want to account. We’ll start with some sentences from mathematics that appear 
to parallel sentences containing normative terms, for reasons that will become clear.22 
Consider the following claims:  
1a. That it’s Monday does not explain why seven is prime. 
1b. That it’s Monday does not explain why each even integer greater 
than two is the sum of two primes. 
1c. The fact that seven is prime is not even partly grounded in the 
fact that it’s Monday. 
 
                                               
21 By ‘distinctively normative truths’ we mean truths that are not knowable, e.g., through grasp of logical concepts. For 
example, even the simple s-reductivist might claim that either an act is wrong or it isn’t is knowable by grasping the 
meaning of negation and disjunction.  
22 Parfit (2017: 72) himself uses such analogies each time he motivates the Objection. Laskowski (2018) suggests his 
use of such analogies are inadequate. We take ourselves to be improving on Parfit’s use of such analogies. 
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Anyone who both grasps what day of the week it is and believes that the truth of the 
Goldbach conjecture or of whether some integer is prime depends on or is explained by which day 
of the week it is, is simply incompetent with the mathematical concepts involved. No one who 
understands the thoughts expressed by these claims could doubt their truth. True, understanding 
the thought that it’s Monday or that seven is prime doesn’t require knowledge of its truth -- either 
could be cogently doubted under the right circumstances. But as long as one also grasps EXPLAIN, 
then, we claim, 1a is analytically knowable. The same goes for 1b and 1c.23 Precisely how sentences 
like 1a-c are analytically knowable is vexed — it’s an issue that we cannot possibly hope to 
adjudicate fully here on our own. Fortunately, however, Fine (2005: Chapter 9) has long defended 
a picture of the metaphysics of modality that, if extended in an intuitive way, not only entails that 
1a-c are analytically knowable but explains why that’s so in a way that gives force to our reading of 
Parfit’s Objection.24 Or so we’ll now argue.  
 
3.2 Grounding the Analytically Knowable in Ethics and Elsewhere 
There aren’t many uncontroversial claims about the nature of contemporary metaphysical inquiry, 
but one candidate for the least controversial has to be that it is at least partly concerned with the 
study of relative fundamentality. For example, molecules are constituted by but do not constitute 
atoms. One appealing lesson to draw from such an asymmetry is that atoms are metaphysically 
                                               
23 We don’t claim everyone knows that 1a-c express truths. Some people don’t fully grasp philosophically sophisticated 
concepts like EXPLAIN. These people lack analytic knowledge of the thoughts expressed by 1a-c. However, once one 
grasps all the concepts expressed by 1a-c and how those concepts compose the thoughts that those sentences express, 
the truths expressed by 1a-c are analytically knowable. 
24 Fellow travelers of Fine include Skarsaune (2015) and Fogal & Risberg (manuscript). 
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prior to, or more fundamental than, the molecules that they constitute. A molecule depends on its 
constituent atoms for its existence in a way that the atoms don’t depend on the molecule for their 
existence. One way to express this thought is to say that molecules are grounded in atoms but not 
vice versa.25  
Of course, there are applications for grounding beyond the context of atoms and molecules. 
We can, for example, seek an answer to the question of what makes or grounds the necessity of 
necessary propositions, like the necessary propositions expressed by 1a-c. On a standard picture, 
necessary propositions are necessary propositions because of how things are at every world. For 
example, the proposition that either Socrates exists or he doesn’t is necessary because every world 
verifies one of the disjuncts and a disjunction’s truth-value is explained by the truth-values its 
disjuncts. The proposition’s necessity, therefore, depends on quantifying over possibilities. 
Following usage suggested by Fine’s terminology, we’ll call necessary propositions that are 
necessary because of how things are at every world ‘worldly necessities’.  
Philosophers have tended to think that all necessities are worldly. Fine, however, calls our 
attention to a different way of grounding a proposition’s necessity. His idea is that, in contrast to 
worldly necessities that are necessary because of how things are at every world, there are necessary 
propositions that are necessary regardless of how things are at any world.26 Fine uses the example 
of the necessary proposition that Socrates is self-identical to illustrate the difference. According to 
                                               
25 In our experience, many philosophers tend to assume that claims about grounding are exotic, involving suspicious, 
advanced philosophical machinery. This is likely due to the tremendous amount of recent attention that grounding 
has received, much of the discussion of which is technical. But while the precise, formal nature of grounding itself has 
been the recent focus of renewed interest, grounding claims themselves are a highly familiar form of metaphysical 
explanation that have been with us, especially ethicists, as Berker (forthcoming) emphasizes, consistently since at least 
Aristotle.  
26 Fine uses the word “transcendental” in characterizing this notion. We depart slightly for ease of exposition.  
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Fine, that Socrates is self-identical is a necessary proposition regardless of how things are at any 
world — the proposition’s necessity doesn't depend on quantifying over possibilities. Fine calls 
such necessities unworldly necessities, and he offers an evocative vignette that we find helpful for 
grasping this novel but intuitive distinction:27 
[…] we might think of the possible circumstances as being under 
God’s control; it is what he decides upon in deciding whether to 
create one possible world rather than another. Thus he can decide 
whether Socrates exists or not and so he can do something that will 
guarantee that Socrates exists or does not exist. But there is nothing 
he can do that will guarantee that Socrates is self-identical or that 
2+2 is equal to 4; these are the [unworldly] facts that provide the 
framework in which he makes the decisions that he does, not the 
facts yet to be decided. (2005: 325)28 
 
In sum, each disjunct of the necessary proposition that Socrates exists or he doesn’t is 
grounded in how things are at each world, for whether Socrates exists is contingent. This makes it 
a worldly necessity. By contrast, the necessary proposition that Socrates is self-identical is not 
grounded on how things are at each world. This makes it an unworldly necessity — its truth is 
grounded in something essential to particulars, namely, their self-identity. 
With Fine’s distinction between worldly and unworldly necessary truths in place, we end 
up with a natural explanation of why the necessary truths expressed by 1a-c are knowable 
analytically. Mathematical truths, like that seven is prime, are unworldly. Like the unworldliness 
                                               
27  “...a worldly [necessity’s]...truth-value always turns favourably on how things turn out, while a [unworldly 
necessity’s]...truth-value does not turn on how things turn out.” (2005: 325) 
28 Fine (2005: 322-324) also motivates his distinction with an analogy between tensed sentences. According to Fine, 
we can draw an intuitive distinction between sentences that are true at a time because of how things are at that time 
and sentences that are true at a time regardless of how things are at that time, or, indeed, any time. For example, 
‘Socrates is self-identical’ is true whenever ‘Socrates is drinking hemlock’ is. But only the truth of the latter sentence 
depends on how things are at the relevant time. By contrast, the truth of ‘Socrates is self-identical’ is independent of 
how things are at any particular time. 
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of the truth that Socrates is self-identical, they are not made true by possibilities like that it’s 
Monday. That is, the conditions under which seven is prime is true don’t involve contingent 
spatiotemporal facts; much like whether Socrates is self-identical, whether it is the case that seven 
is prime is wholly independent of who or what is where when.  
Furthermore, on the assumption that there is a close association between truth conditions 
and meaning29 and given that the worldly/unworldly distinction involves a distinction in how the 
relevant propositions are made true, that the truth expressed by ‘seven is prime’ is unworldly is part 
of its meaning. For that reason, 1a-c are analytically knowable. With several plausible examples of 
necessities from outside of ethics that are analytically knowable in virtue of their relationship to 
unworldly necessities on the table, we can now put the finishing touches on Parfit’s Objection. 
 
3.3 Putting it All Together 
Just like claims about mathematics and claims about self-identity, moral principles are necessary 
when true. This distinguishes moral principles from merely contingent obligations. For example, 
suppose that utilitarianism is the true moral principle. If it is, it is only sometimes true that we 
must not lie. We must not lie when, and only when, it fails to maximally promote utility. But 
because lying sometimes promotes utility, it is not necessary that we must not lie. That’s what 
makes the obligation merely contingent. By contrast, if the principle of utility is true — that the 
unique moral duty is to maximize the balance of pleasure over pain — it is necessarily true. In that 
                                               
29 That there is a connection between truth-conditions and meaning is yet another controversial issue that we do not 
have the space to defend. But we take it that the assumption has a rich enough history to permit us to defer on the 
issue.  
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case, it is impossible that we are morally obligated to do something other than to maximally 
promote utility; necessarily we must maximally promote utility.  
In light of Fine’s two kinds of necessity, we can ask where moral principles fall along the 
distinction. Comparing the following sentences with the 1a-c sentences makes the answer vivid: 
 
2a. That it’s Monday does not partly explain why we ought morally 
to do what would maximize the balance of pleasure over pain. 
2b. The Principle of Utility is true not even partly in virtue of the 
fact that it’s Monday. 
2c. The Principle of Utility is not even partly grounded in the fact 
that it’s Monday. 
2d. The Principle of Utility is not even true partly in virtue of the 
fact that we’re in Chicago. 
2e. The Principle of Utility is not even partly grounded in the fact 
that we’re in Chicago. 
 
Like 1a-c, if 2a-e express truths, then they are clearly knowable analytically.30 Moreover, it is also 
clear that the necessary propositions expressed by both 1a-c and 2a-e are unworldly — they are 
necessary because they are true regardless of how things are at any world.31  
That the propositions expressed by 2a-e are unworldly serves as the lynchpin in our reading 
of Parfit’s Objection. Recall that we characterized reductivism negatively at the outset of this paper, 
as the denial of the non-reductivist’s claim that the metaphysical nature of normativity is not fully 
explicable in non-normative terms. This characterization doesn’t tell us much about what the 
                                               
30 Of course, utilitarianism is likely false, so 2a-e may not express truths. But we’re using utilitarianism as a stand-in 
for the true moral principle. We could just have easily replaced ‘principle of utility’ with ‘categorical imperative’. 
31 Parfit has long emphasized that mathematics serves as a fruitful parallel for theorizing about ethics. We agree, as 
we find the similarities between sentences 1a-c and 2a-c striking. Note, however, that Parfit often appears to suggest 
that in arguing against s-reductivist views, that he is arguing merely by analogy. We are illustrating that there are 
resources available him to do more.   
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metaphysics of normativity looks like from the perspective of reductivism, nor does the corollary, 
positive characterization of reductivism as the view that normativity is fully explicable in non-
normative terms. This is by design, as it captures the general approach of reductivism under one 
big tent, leaving space for particular versions of reductivism to differ, by identifying different kinds 
of facts to serve as the reduction base for normative facts.  
As it happens, reductivists have not been so different from each other. By far, as we’ve 
suggested throughout the paper, the most common reductive view in ethics is Reductive Naturalism 
(“naturalism”), the view that normative facts are fully explicable in terms of “natural” facts.32 Like 
reductivism, naturalism is also a big tent, leaving space for naturalists to differentiate themselves 
from one another by offering different views about which facts are natural. But just as we find with 
reductivists, most naturalists also happen to endorse a similar kind of naturalism. In particular, 
according to the dominant characterization of naturalism, the natural facts that can fully explicate 
normative facts are those that figure in empirical or scientific inquiry.33 As to what makes facts 
figuring in empirical or scientific inquiry suitable for figuring in empirical or scientific inquiry, 
however, there is little agreement among naturalists.  
Nevertheless, it is surely a hallmark of the facts figuring in empirical or scientific inquiry 
that they are spatially and temporally located. But if so, then naturalists are in trouble, for the true 
moral principle is, as we’ve seen, an unworldly fact that is not made true by any world; it’s not made 
true by any spatio-temporal facts of the kind with which empirical or scientific inquiry seems to 
                                               
32 See, inter alia, Shafer-Landau (2003), McPherson (2015), and Lutz & Lenman (2018). 
33 For example, it is often said that natural facts are those that found in empirical or scientific explanations. It is also 
often said that natural facts are those that are discoverable via empirical or scientific inquiry. See Dowell (2013) for 
more on the different ways these relations to empirical or scientific inquiry tend to be cashed out.  
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be, at least intuitively, essentially concerned.34 Together with our assumption that there is a close 
connection between truth-conditions and meaning, the moral principles mentioned in sentences 
like 2a-e have unworldliness as part of their meaning. Moral principles have unworldliness as part 
of their meaning exactly in the way that ‘seven is prime’ does. Put another way, sentences expressing 
truths about moral principles have unworldliness as part of their content. This is why, on a brand 
of non-reductivism that takes Fine as inspiration, 2a-e are knowable analytically or on the basis of 
our competence with normative concepts alone. This is also why the impossibility of at least one 
highly intuitive version of naturalism is knowable on the basis of our competence with normative 
concepts alone, just as Parfit argued 22 years ago.35 
Of course, Parfit seems to have set out to use the Objection to show that our competence 
with normative concepts alone puts us in a position to know not just that a particular version of 
reductive naturalism is impossible, but that every version of reductivism is impossible. One might 
think, then, that we’ve come up short of our goal of showing that there’s an underappreciated 
reading of Parfit’s Objection that can get him everything he suggests he wants out of it.  
We have two reactions to this worry that we’ll offer to close out our argument. First, we 
don’t think it’s any small feat to have shown that the historically most dominant species of 
reductivism, or at least a view very much in the spirit of the most prominent understanding of 
                                               
34 To be sure, the relationship between truth-makers and necessary propositions is controversial. Since anything 
necessitates a necessary truth, it might seem that everything is a truth-maker for a necessary truth. Or, if we find this 
implication implausible, we might conclude that nothing is a truth-maker for a necessary truth. But this is where we 
find Fine’s distinction between transcendental and merely necessary truths especially fruitful. Surely it is intuitive that 
certain contingent states of affairs involving Socrates and hemlock, whether actual or merely possible, play a role in 
making the thought expressed by “Either Socrates is drinking hemlock or he isn’t” true which don’t play a role in 
making the thought expressed by “Seven is prime” true. 
35 Facts about the spatiotemporal distribution of instantiations of natural properties form the basis for naturalistic 
reduction of all truths in the metaphysics of at least one prominent reductivist: Lewis’ Humean Supervenience -- see 
Lewis (1991, 2001). We take this as evidence that our argument against s-reductivism is on target. 
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reductivism, faces a serious challenge. Secondly, and more substantively, we think that our reading 
gets everything that Parfit should want out of the Objection. Reductivists who claim that moral 
principles are reducible to facts about the spatial and temporal location of instantiations of 
properties (natural or otherwise) are recognizably reductivist, and our version of the Objection tells 
against them. While reductivists can defend a version of their view on which normative facts are 
not reducible to facts about the spatial and temporal location of instantiations of naturalistically 
respectable properties, such a version of reductivism seems to us be so close to non-reductivism 
that it becomes hard to see whether such a view would preserve whatever advantage the former 
claims over the latter.36 
 
4. Conclusion 
In sum, the exclusively negative reception that Parfit’s Objection has received is unmerited. Critics 
have failed to appreciate how the Objection illuminates certain under-discussed implications of s-
reductivism. Ultimately, we’ve argued that the Objection is a dilemma, with each horn of the 
dilemma addressing a different version of s-reductivism, which differ in whether they are 
consistent with a priori knowledge of distinctively normative truths.  Depending on which horn 
the s-reductivist faces, either she must renounce all such knowledge, such as the plausibly analytic 
truth that rightness is not a yellow rose, or she must attribute meanings to normative terms that 
                                               
36 We claim that our reading gets everything that Parfit should want, because we suspect that there is very much at 
stake in the debate between non-reductivists and reductivists. But it’s worth noting that, if responding to our reading 
of the Objection puts pressure on reductivists to collapse the distinction between their view and non-reductivism, 
Parfit himself would have very much welcomed such a result. For in the twilight of his career, Parfit came to think 
that reductivists, non-reductivists, and expressivists are all climbing the same metaethical mountain, as it were, and 
that there is no substantive dispute among these views.  
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are difficult to reconcile with reductivism, suggesting that her theory is inconsistent. Either horn 
forces the s-reductivist to confront unattractive and underexplored implications of her view. 
 Though we find the Objection forceful, we’ve noted at least five places where the s-
reductivist can resist it. First, she can endorse simple s-reductivism and embrace the first horn, 
renouncing all a priori knowledge of distinctively normative truths. Second, she can maintain 
simple s-reductivism and claim that normative truths like that rightness is not a yellow rose are a 
priori, but deny that they are analytic. This forces her to develop a view about synthetic a priori 
knowledge of the normative. Third, she can argue that there is a difference between the truth that 
rightness is not a yellow rose and the truth that the fact that it’s Monday does not explain why the 
true moral theory is true, such that the former is a priori but the latter isn’t. This will force her to 
say more about the meanings involved in moral principles than she has. Fourth, she may choose 
to contest Fine’s distinction between worldly and unworldly necessities and take on board some 
additional, purely metaphysical commitments over-and-above her metaethical commitments. 
Finally, she may broaden the base of facts to which normative truths are reduced to include more 
than facts about who or what was where when. In broadening that base, she risks her claim to 
naturalism, the preservation of which is the motivation behind many reductivist theses. None of 
these ways of resisting the Objection has been adequately explored but, given the Objection, 
reductivists now must develop their view in one of these directions. Parfit’s Normativity Objection 
pushes reductivists to be clearer than they have been about their own view. This is its legacy.  
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